Cities and Citizenship*

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Introduction

Citizenship is a contested concept. In the last two decades there has been a prolific social and political science literature concerned with the need to revise previous analyses of citizenship. Given the rapid changes in the practice of citizenship, further new conceptual and empirical analysis is necessary, hence this special issue of IJURR. It has a wide territorial scope, with case studies from the Americas, Europe, China and the Middle East. In Europe, the social and political consequences of the collapse of the state socialist systems have modified the relation between social and political rights of citizenship as stated in the Marshallian evolutionary approach. T.H. Marshall explained the evolution of civic, political and social rights in Britain: the first two sets of rights strengthened by liberalism and reformism and the third by the development of the welfare state. However, in recent years, in societies located in central and eastern Europe a very different development has taken place. The gain of political rights after 1989 has coincided with a reduction of the social rights that existed in the previous non-democratic regimes. Thus new democratic mechanisms appear to undermine those citizens’ rights which are enabling, in the sense that they provide both life chances and personal security. In Latin American cities and to a large extent in central Europe, there is a danger of confusing the return to civic and political citizenship with a ‘restoration of laissez-faire capitalism’. This analysis is considered by Roberts and Ferge in this collection.

The contemporary significance of citizenship principles is particularly meaningful for the organization of cities, as this issue shows. Historically, citizenship first emerged in the cities of Ancient Greece and Rome and developed as the privileged status of a limited group of men in some medieval European cities, as Max Weber explained. Today, however, citizenship is defined at the nation-state level and is therefore linked to national sovereignty. Formally, citizenship is associated with membership of a political community (state), that is, with ‘nationality’; substantively, it relates to the possession of specific rights and the obligation to comply with certain duties within the state or political community. Formal decisions about who becomes a citizen are taken by the state itself, but the quality of citizenship (rights and duties) is often the result of conflict and negotiation between the social and political forces in a country. The practice of citizenship becomes a method of inclusion which in principle gives people who differ in age, sex, beliefs or colour of skin the same basic entitlement. Thus citizenship is a means of obtaining entitlements in order to enlarge people’s life chances (Dahrendorf, 1979), but also of legitimizing the right to be different in a modern democratic society. Citizenship also involves duties, such as complying with the law, paying taxes or learning enough to

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be employable. There should not be, though, a pay-off between duties and entitlements. Moreover, citizenship also involves obligations of institutions to respond to citizens entitlements (from the courts to institutions of education). Thus, entitlements exist because there are institutions charged with the responsibility to make them effective. However, citizenship is under pressure because although in principle it is universal in its definition, in practice it fails to include all members of societies. This is especially so in contemporary cities. The problem is more acute because cities lack the autonomy and economic resources to enhance citizenship (assuming their government would wish to do so).

The papers in this special issue demonstrate that, as William R. Brubaker (1992) observed, formal citizenship is neither ‘sufficient’ nor a ‘necessary’ condition for the practice of substantive citizenship. On the one hand, the long established citizens’ rights in western democracies have not entailed the full civic, political and social inclusion of all its members. On the other hand, in many parts of the developing world civic and political rights are constantly under threat, while social citizenship is not economically feasible. Moreover, the fact that political citizenship has been denied to a considerable number of residents in Europe has not prevented many of them from benefiting from social rights. A good example is Germany, where long term residents — who experience institutional as well as cultural and legal barriers to becoming full citizens — have equivalent social rights to those of nationals. This pattern is also occurring in other west European countries. The question then, is whether these social rights can be considered rights of citizenship. We return to this matter below.

The dynamic characteristics of citizenship require us to see it as a process and not as a stable societal feature. Two main components have been identified as shaping the vulnerability of the citizenship principle in the western world. One is the retrenchment of the welfare state, the other is the impact of immigration. Both can reinforce each other negatively as people become increasingly concerned about competition for public income and social services, as the paper by Faist and Häußermann indicates. This perception is often exacerbated by messages conveyed by some politicians and the media. In western world cities, migrants are arriving from third world countries or from the East in search of work or political asylum. A crucial question is what rights these newcomers should have.

As increasing capital mobility has concentrated investments in large cities, expanding local labour markets, the problem of ‘including’ migrants arriving in these cities to supply cheap labour had to be tackled both at local and national levels. While local councils have been responsible for providing local services to immigrants, decisions concerning legal incorporation are at the discretion of national governments. In western Europe, debates on the rights of immigrants have a longer record in Britain, France and increasingly Germany than elsewhere, but this topic is becoming a European Union issue, as Smith and Blanc argue in their paper. In the USA, the long experience of incorporating minority groups with full citizenship rights, including participation in the local political arena, has not involved an effective social incorporation of all groups. Formal citizenship rights for black Americans have expanded life chances for many since the 1960s, but not necessarily undermined the discrimination that this group continues to experience in the labour market, challenging the belief that access to political and social rights will translate into greater equality of opportunities. This is clearly shown by the empirical data provided by Norman and Susan Fainstein in their paper.

These processes are not exclusively taking place in the western world. In the East, rural-urban migration is salient as countries have been industrializing at a very fast rate. This is distorting traditional family and community structures, as well as social values. In post-Mao China, the liberalization of the economy is also encouraging a looser social

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1 For an analysis of the relation between capital mobility and migration see Sassen (1990).
organization as controls are easing with the large number of rural workers moving into the urban centres. Here, the Chinese social structure seems to be experiencing what Kam Wing Chan, in his paper, sees as an increasing social and spatial dualization, with consequent dangers of political instability. What is particularly interesting in the Chinese case is that, until recently, urban citizens' rights constituted a privilege for those who live in cities. This exclusive urban citizenship operated in the context of strict control over rural-urban migration. However, in recent years, ex-rural migrants have been arriving in large numbers without being eligible for these social rights and they therefore constitute a 'second class' group in urban societies. The fact that new frontiers of citizenship are arising in cities, as economic liberalization takes place in China and in other parts of the world, requires new analytical insights as well as further empirical analysis.

Urban political conflict over citizenship issues can be deeply rooted in broader ethno-national conflict which needs solutions both at national and local levels, as Shlomo Hasson argues in his paper based on research in Jerusalem. When a hegemonic group exercises restrictions over other groups, as in this city, citizenship becomes contested in ethnic terms. In this context local politics, that is, the command over political resources by each group, has proved a determining factor in shaping the city's social structure in a way that echoes Max Weber's analysis of the European medieval city. However, Hasson's paper suggests a more complex situation in which citizenship is contested not only by social and political inequality, but also by the demand of a group for community rights in order for the members of this group to enjoy individual rights. We shall return to this question later.

Therefore, the papers in this special issue tackle the new challenges of citizenship in different ways, some of which are discussed in the rest of this introduction, which does not attempt to be a review of the existing literature (for this see Turner, 1986; Roche, 1987; Barbalet, 1988; Plant, 1988; Heather, 1990). What the present introduction and the rest of the issue aims to do is to highlight the relevance of urban analysis in understanding the different responses and means of adoption within national states to the new challenges of citizenship. Local variations concerning definitions of citizenship are complex. Citizenship involves legal underpinning and local governments do not have, generally, the power to legislate. This fact, however, does not prevent the establishment of acquired local social rights which may be the result of local distributive outcomes. Although these effects can spread to other localities (cities or regions), an institutional impact may require their legal incorporation by national parliaments. This explains why debates within national parliaments and their decisions on changing citizenship rights are also crucial to the understanding of current urban social conditions. But since where a citizen lives within a country makes a difference to his or her life chances, urban analysis has an important contribution to make to theoretical and practical debates on citizenship. The present issue aims to stimulate new and contrasting analyses in this sphere.

T.H. Marshall and the class dimension of citizenship

Most contemporary discussions on citizenship are indebted to the work of T.H. Marshall. His essay Citizenship and social class (1950) provided the basis for a modern theory of citizenship. He defines citizenship as the status which confers full membership in a society: 'It defines people's standing independent of the relative value attached to their contribution to the economic process' (Dahrendorf, 1994: 13). Although citizenship is a 'non-economic concept', it directly affects the social structure of a given society. In Marshall's analysis there is an ambiguous tension between citizenship and status. He emphasizes the significance of citizenship in: (1) reducing risk and insecurity; (2) elevating civilized life; (3) bringing about equality of status which he sees as more
important than equality of income; (4) providing a common experience and therefore a common culture; and (5) operating to legitimate class differences. According to Marshall, the universal status of citizenship undermines inequality, as its practice means incorporation or membership in a society, while it also helps to legitimate social inequality. However, what is also important for Marshall is that the effects of citizenship compress both ends of the scale of income distribution via direct taxation and the ‘social wage’ (1950: 75). Given the apparent contradictory nature of these statements, Marshall has been alternately criticized and defended by many authors on different grounds. The nature and outcome of the tension between citizenship and class has been the main source for criticism. However, Dahrendorf long ago suggested that the equalizing effects of citizenship in Marshall’s work were ‘irrelevant for the problem of class’, because his preoccupation was instead with social stratification and, as Barbalet points out, there was no consideration in his work of ‘the economic function of wealth or personal property’ (1988: 56). What citizenship does, according to Marshall, is to reduce class differences in terms of status, not in terms of economic inequalities. Moreover, economic growth and a new social contract in the context of a postwar period of social reconstruction allowed a kind of consensus with regard to generalized societal policy. The citizenship principle was linked in the UK (and also the Scandinavian countries) to equality and reflected to some extent the outcomes of ‘redistributive conflicts’, enhanced by the exercise of collective civil rights by trade unions. The aim was to obtain social rights by means of claims for social justice. This was an important point in Marshall’s work, for citizenship enhanced ‘a growing interest in equality as a principle of social justice’ (1950: 40). In practice then, social justice was a major consideration in the development of social rights in the British and Scandinavian cases, whereas in continental Europe, the French revolutionary tradition on the one hand, and Catholic traditions on the other, stressed social solidarity (see Esping-Andersen’s analysis on the different European welfare regimes).

The class analysis aspect of citizenship has been emphasized by some authors who put more emphasis than Marshall on the conflictual aspect of citizenship development than on the view that citizenship creates loyalty and a sense of belonging. Giddens (1982), for example, has argued that advances in citizenship are directly related to the strength of class conflict. According to him, Social Democracy regimes create space for the institutionalization of class conflict while legitimizing societal differences (1978). This emphasis on class conflict has been contested by Barbalet (1988), who stresses that ultimately it is always the state which decides on the extension of citizenship and that not only is there not always such a direct relation between class conflict and citizenship, but also that the outcome of such conflict has been repression in many cases. Mann (1987) has shown the historical significance of the different ‘strategies’ adopted by actors involved in class conflict, as well as the state’s role in the particular ways (from liberal to authoritarian socialist) in which citizenship definitions and practices have evolved in Europe. In this issue, Roberts shows that this has been the case in particular periods in the history of Latin America. Another historical example is Spain, where a long dictatorial regime followed the 1936–39 civil war which had a strong class content.

2 Zsuzsa Ferge has defined ‘societal policy’ as the sphere of social policy plus ‘systematic social intervention at all points of the cycle of the reproduction of social life, with the aim of changing the structure of society’ (1979), quoted in Tom Bottomore, 1992: 62.
3 The term has been used by Walter Korpi (1994: 1) to characterize the Marshallian approach to citizenship, indicating the tensions created between the equalizing principle of a common set of rights and the existing social inequalities. The term ‘redistributive conflicts’ refers to a context in which there is, over time, a changing distribution of power resources among the various social and political groups.
4 Gosta Esping-Andersen (1990) emphasizes the participation of socialist parties in national parliaments to further develop social welfare.
5 For a critique of Mann’s analysis see Bryan Turner (1992).
The practice of citizenship reinforces the sense of belonging, according to Marshall, because it provides common experiences. He makes specific references to the use of the National Health Service by all citizens in Britain. However, what is implicit but not openly discussed by Marshall is the relative homogeneity of social classes which allowed for class identification and for the working class pursuit of first political and then social rights. Thus, no consideration was given in his work to the increasing ethnic heterogeneity of the lower income groups of British society in the larger cities. Although, as Marshall stressed, citizenship provides an undifferentiated status in the sense that those who possess citizenship status ‘are equal with respect to the rights and duties with which the status is endowed’, the reality is that the capacity to exercise such rights is closely related to the citizens’ ability to obtain power resources which, in the larger cities, are structured by class, gender and ethnicity (Korpi, 1994: 8).

Historically, class identity and class collective action can be seen as a crucial actor in advancing citizenship. In the last decades, however, there has been a considerable impact made by multi-class as well as ethnic urban social movements that have gained increasing power over local economic and political resources. Also, the middle class has been incorporated within the welfare state to a very large extent, so this class has also been a significant actor in the urban context to expand and enhance social rights. The important contribution of social movements, such as the Black Power movement in the USA, is that — as Marshall recognized — they did not seek admission into mainstream society but claimed the right to a new multi-racial society. In this sense, the contribution of such social movements is not only to achieve material gains but also to redefine institutions. This is a very important point for it highlights the impact that citizenship has in changing societies. However, it is particularly noticeable that since the 1980s, urban social movements have only had a weak input to the expansion of citizenship. Contemporary urban social movements are more fragmented (socially and politically) and far more heterogeneous than in the 1960s and 1970s. They suffer from economic insecurity and competition for limited public financial support (Mayer, 1995). Several factors have contributed to this, such as the new structure of labour markets which favours the expansion of jobs at both ends of the scale and leaves workers at the lower end with little bargaining power; the entrepreneurial role played by city councils in promoting cities and cutting resources for social entitlements; the development of urban poverty; and last but not least, the pursuit of self-determination on the basis of ethnic or religious communities, rather than striving for the consolidation of heterogeneous societies with common citizen rights and obligations.

Community membership, immigration and the ethnic dimension

The assertion that ‘citizenship requires a direct sense of community membership based on loyalty to a civilisation which is a common possession’ (Marshall, 1950: 40-1) is more than problematic today. History proves that citizenship can be exclusive in modern societies. In the United States, for example, the ‘modern ‘scientific’ concept of ‘race’ justified the subjection of blacks at the very moment when the discourse of ‘citizenship’

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6 There are no references in Marshall’s work on citizenship to the incorporation of the immigrant population in the UK, despite the fact that large immigration from the New Commonwealth was having an impact in the larger industrial cities while he was producing his essays.

7 Manuel Castells, among others, gave a broad analysis on different urban contexts in The City and the Grassroots (1993).

8 Marshall’s acknowledgement of the Black Movement in the USA seems contradictory in view of his lack of concern with the ethnic question in Britain. It appears that in the absence of an equivalent social movement he did not see ethnicity as a problem in the British development of citizenship.
proclaimed liberty the natural birthright of ‘man’” (Frazer and Gordon, 1994). At present, citizenship understood as a civilizing process is also used by the anti-Muslim camp as a tool against Islamic religion and ways of life in European cities. This not only involves imposing hegemonic views on what constitutes civility, but can also constitute the basis for denying equality of rights (Anthias, 1992). These practices are, of course, connected with racial discrimination and with the increasing salience of nationalism.

Brubaker (1992) has demonstrated the territorial closure involved in definitions of citizenship as the status of the citizen is restricted. Only traditional countries of immigration, such as the USA and Canada, but also Latin American countries, ascribed citizenship to all persons born within their territories. By contrast, continental Europe uses citizenship as an instrument of ‘social closure’, even if there are important distinctions within the European political traditions. This ‘social closure’ has been one reason why it took some time for ethnic minorities to be active forces in the expansion of citizenship in the different urban contexts. The concrete reality of social closure is that it limits life chances and inhibits the sharing of common experiences, such as social and political organization. In the UK, immigrant workers did not participate in trade union organizations, or organize themselves into pressure groups promoting ethnic identity as a relevant issue for the expansion of social rights until the 1970s in the largest urban centres (Rex and Tomlinson, 1979). The acquisition of some rights (such as political or civic) has been relatively easy for ex-colonial migrants, although housing rights and urban incorporation have been difficult and subject to racial discrimination. By contrast, ethnic civic movements were needed in the USA for black Americans to acquire such rights and it was not until the 1970s that most blacks gained civil and political rights. The acquisition of these rights has had important consequences for the opening up of access to public employment and wider participation in society, but has not prevented negative images surviving among sectors of the non-black population, sustaining a system of social inequality.

In the EU countries there is considerable variation and complexity in the ways in which non-EU nationals are accepted and given rights, whether of residence or of social citizenship. Naturalization and citizenship policies for immigrants do not follow a ‘policy regime’s’ logic (Baldwin-Edwards, 1991: 207). The time required for immigrants to gain access to naturalization varies from five years (France, Ireland, Italy, The Netherlands and the UK) to ten years (Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg and Spain) with other countries falling between these two figures. The procedures range from the most liberal (Denmark and The Netherlands) to the least (Germany, Belgium and Greece). Whereas in Denmark, local political rights have been granted after three years of residence for some time now, in Germany and France political activities within immigrant groups have been discouraged. Social policy, such as education, family support and housing, has been more generous in the north European countries, including France and Germany. In Ireland and southern Europe there has been little social provision for immigrants and their families. All these variations make a general discussion of cross-national variations in citizenship for non-EU nationals fairly imprecise. One of the reasons is that the regimes of welfare for nationals apply to immigrants in a more selective and diversified way, which makes systematization and mapping more difficult.

The European Union is confronted with the challenge of advancing a common definition which could broaden the experience of citizenship in Europe. In this issue, Smith and Blanc argue for the EU to promote a territorial definition of citizenship instead of an ethno-national definition. So far, however, European citizenship seems to reinforce

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9 In the early 1980s, with the consequent expansion of immigration in Britain as well as the economic recession, the government’s emphasis has increasingly (clearly since the 1960s) been on limiting the numbers of incomers to the country.

10 A recent study by Yasemin N. Soysal (1994) has compared patterns of social incorporation in Germany, France, The Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom.
social closure. Although about ten million immigrants from non-EU countries reside legally within the Union, only the five million or so EU national migrants benefit from the rights bestowed by the Maastricht treaty. Thus, only formal citizens of member states are European citizens, even though millions of other residents have been living in Europe for more than a generation.\textsuperscript{11}

Thus, in the developed western world, increasingly tight immigration controls have also contributed to revive the debate on citizenship and its relationship to residence. From an institutional point of view the three classical dimensions of citizenship are treated differently: there is little discussion of civil rights; political rights are mostly linked to sovereignty; while social rights are subject to changes in welfare policies. However, these dimensions are intertwined. In the sphere of social rights there are at least two basic questions which are important for sociological analysis: (1) do social rights constitute social citizenship? and (2) who is eligible for social rights? Whereas the first question is worth discussing at a general level here, the second is empirical and diverse answers are provided by the papers included in this special issue.

First, according to Marshall, citizens’ rights provide security because the failure to grant them is subject to sanctions. This fact contributes to the status of membership in a society. It is somehow assumed that rights provide access to opportunities which enhance participation. However, such citizenship is distinguished from the social rights offered by dictatorships or one-party bureaucracies, not only because civic and political participation is not allowed in these regimes, but also because here such rights only serve to compensate those who are excluded from citizenship by buying their loyalty. Indeed, securing loyalty through the introduction of selective social legislation that emulates social democracies is what reactionary regimes have done in the past. The expansion of social policy in Germany under Bismark and later on in southern Europe and Latin America within dictatorial regimes are good examples of this. In the case of Spain, social legislation was broadened to larger sectors of the population to secure political continuity.\textsuperscript{12} The contention that ‘groups of citizens who are relatively weak in terms of economic resources tend to act collectively in the political sector, where their disadvantage in terms of power resources is less pronounced, to modify the conditions for and outcomes of distributive processes on the markets’ (Korpi, 1994: 9) operates only within democratic governance. In fact, part of the difficulty of comparing citizenship practices linked to social policy is that democratic mechanisms have been taken for granted in the explanation of the impact of distributive conflicts on social citizenship. As Bismark’s introduction of social insurance for workers has often been seen more in historical terms as a step forward to the continental development of the welfare state than as a modern pattern of social inclusion, there has been considerable difficulty in incorporating countries following a similar pattern under dictatorial regimes like those of southern or central and eastern Europe in recent comparative analyses of social policy. This is another reason why the work of Zsuzsa Ferge in this issue is so important and has an explanatory value in this context even if her approach is not particularly territorial.\textsuperscript{13} There is also another application of this interpretation to long established residents living in European cities. That is, that the social rights granted to them can be seen as a compensating mechanism for failing to incorporate them within the full membership of

\textsuperscript{11} In the Maastricht treaty references to immigration do not appear under its supranational headings. According to Patrick Ireland (1995), within the EU immigration remains a member state prerogative.

\textsuperscript{12} For example, by 1970 State Health Assistance covered 84% of the population, while secondary schooling continued to be highly privatized or under the control of the Catholic Church. For the Spanish transition from marginal social policies to universal coverage see García (1994).

\textsuperscript{13} In the case of China, as explained by Kam Wing Chan in this issue, urban dwellers are granted social rights which resemble more the pre-modern city rights existing in west European cities than modern citizenship. In this sense they can be referred to as privileges.
these societies. As in non-democratic societies, citizenship is substituted for welfare clientelism. However, welfare clients do not constitute full members of society and remain in a rather vulnerable societal position.

Second, eligibility for citizenship and the consequences of not being eligible are key questions for urban researchers. Today, the ethnic dimension needs to be considered in order to find appropriate solutions to citizens' real opportunities. Ethnic disadvantage in labour markets is clearer for blacks whether they are Afro-Americans in US cities or Afro-Caribbeans and some Asians in the UK (just to mention two countries studied in this issue that also have other groups). In the USA, welfare dependence provokes negative reactions, partly because poverty is explained in terms of the personal characteristics of the poor and not in terms of structural conditions such as changes in the labour market. Increasingly, the need for welfare is associated with women of doubtful morality or some racial minorities. In any case, the feeling among those who pay taxes and do not receive some services is that those who get welfare are abusing the system. The housing sphere is the other place where discrimination is most apparent and where racial inequality is closely related to public policy. 'From the earliest stages of the arrival of black migrants in post-war Britain the disadvantages they suffered in the housing market were a major issue of concern in some localities' (Solomos, 1991: 147). It has been widely argued that equal access to housing as well as other local services is central to people's life chances. Also it has been an important source of racial tension in the UK (and elsewhere, e.g. France). As in the labour market, ethnic minorities, particularly blacks, were discriminated against during four decades of immigration. However, some commitment to race equality has operated within local councils, some of which have recruited many black and ethnic minorities staff to departments dealing with social housing. But these local government initiatives have been increasingly challenged by central government restrictions in funding (see the case studies of some London local authorities) (Solomos, 1991: 153) How to maintain such local achievements in the face of global economic trends and national policies is a key problem. In the face of restrictive funding, the problems become more acute, changing from issues of housing quality to problems of homelessness and racial harassment. Thus, a loss of political citizenship exacerbates social inequalities and promotes open conflict. In Germany, access to housing has also been seen as a source of racial conflict, given the large numbers of immigrants settling in the early 1990s (and the case of racial conflict in French social housing is notorious). Faist and Häußermann provide a detailed analysis of this question in this issue. According to them, xenophobic actions have been directed especially against those immigrants who appear most culturally different from native Germans.

The 1980s witnessed a transference of allegiance of affluent workers from socialist to liberal conservative parties in the UK, to a lesser extent in Germany and even less so in

14 In the USA the term 'welfare' has very negative connotations and therefore those dependent on welfare are stigmatized. According to Wilson, this is one more element in the existence of an urban underclass. Fraser and Gordon attribute the stigma to an ideological construction based on the fact that US civil society has evolved on the basis of a 'contract' (private) which is opposed to 'charity' (public). Both articles in Bart van Steenbergen (1994).

15 An interesting outcome of this analysis is that members of left-wing groups were not altogether convinced of the preeminence of race equality policies. Another important element has been the participation of black councillors in the discussion of policies in cooperation with ‘The Housing and Race Relations Sub-Committee’ (Solomos, 1991: 155). But as pointed out before, constraints in financial resources should be analyzed in relation to the cutting of local public funding by central government.

16 In his analysis of the London boroughs of Hackney and Haringey, John Solomos concludes, 'central to identifying the cause of the failure to bring about radical change is a fuller understanding of the relevance and interdependence of political commitment, the persistence of organisational opposition, and the resource constraints imposed by central government' (1991: 156).
France, where collectivist aims and a stronger sense of corporatist solidarity did not give way to economic liberal conservative thinking. In other north European countries, as well as in the USA, the constitution of both formal and substantive citizenship has also been shaken. In the larger cities of these countries, the emergence of 'second class citizens' which are often institutionally isolated (Gans, 1993: 331) became a phenomenon which had a strong ethnic component. Social fragmentation within the traditional working classes divided by ethnicity, gender and location in the labour market has not only divided political allegiances (Harloe and Fainstein, 1994), but has also damaged considerably standards of social justice and principles of solidarity. In the new urban contexts, fresh 'distributive conflicts' are setting the scene for the development of new civil, political and social rights, now with a higher ethnic profile in the case of European cities, but to some extent also in Latin American cities and in traditionally ethnically divided cities, such as Jerusalem. As specific social inequalities are arising from differences in ethno-cultural origin, citizens' rights also need to be extended to new areas. Traditional views, whether liberal, republican or communitarian are only partially relevant.

**National citizenship versus universal human rights**

Some people advocate that new developments in civil, political and social rights should take place within the framework of a human rights conception which is inclusive and leads to universal standards and which is not confined to the citizenship framework linked to nationality (Bottomore, 1992). This claim may be interpreted as a case of the liberal tradition asserting a hegemony over the communitarian tradition. The fact that many advocate this view means that it deserves some further consideration.

The communitarian tradition has been concerned with the practice of citizenship as an obligation to the community, as well as with the conditions in which citizenship can develop. Tocqueville's communitarian position argued that for individuals to engage in citizenship activities:

- they need empowering — in terms of knowledge, skills, information, time and well-being — to become effective agents in the world. They need opportunities - in terms of the decentralisation of both political and economic power - in which they can be effective agents, that is citizens.
- Finally, they need to be provided with the required motivation to take the practice of citizenship seriously, in terms of performing the duties which they owe to the political community of which they are members (Oldfield, 1990: 145).

Tocqueville's 'habits of the heart' and Durkheim's 'conscience collective' are the foundation of this tradition, providing meaning and a sense of belonging and purpose in society as well as a stimulus to the exercise of citizenship. Educating the citizen, as well as reinforcing his or her sense of belonging, go against the liberal individualists, for whom there is no reason to believe that there exists a 'shared conception of the good' but, on the contrary, believe that the space for individualistic moral preferences should be kept as open as possible (Plant, 1991: 22). Thus, the need for the toleration of different moralities is stressed. In fact, liberals have rejected the notion of political community on these same grounds. They prefer the idea of setting up a framework on 'procedural conditions of choice rather than on the objects of choice' (Plant, 1991: 31). However, this thinking implies minimizing social responsibility towards those who have limited choices.

Taking this philosophical debate to the Italian ground, Putnam has shown that in northern Italian regions, where citizens have been practicing civic community relations for centuries, there is more liberalism than in southern regions. 'Ironically, it is the amoral individualists of the less civic regions who find themselves clamoring for sterner law enforcement' (1993: 111-3). Echoing Tocqueville, he argues that civic communities
strengthen democratic government and citizen participation. In these communities citizens educate themselves through the practice of social reciprocity and the extension of social capital.

In urban politics the liberal-individualist tradition has crystallized within the new right politics (mainly in the USA, UK and to some extent also in France) of individualism and voluntarism, but is in fact fostering social cleavages by encouraging the pursuit of economic self-interest. The civic-republican and communitarian traditions have been more likely to be claimed by the left, partly as a reaction to the neo-liberal ideology. The left has been more prone to defend the ideal of political community with reference to an implicit common good which is not always very clearly articulated. For example, successful urban politics involving city regeneration may be presented as a common good for all citizens by left wing city councils, whereas in fact it is the result of a hegemonic consensus under the leadership of local political and economic elites and with uneven benefits for different social classes (Hill, 1994; Garcia, 1993a; 1993b).

Dahrendorf has made a positive move forward by setting a liberal agenda which according to him should also involve, among other things, ‘preventing the formation of an underclass’, granting ‘educational opportunities’ and ‘a basic income guarantee for all’ (1988: 173-80). Here, Dahrendorf is highlighting an important issue which liberals have to come to terms with, i.e. the relation between freedom and ability. Thus, for their liberal predecessors in Britain at the turn of the century, personal responsibility and freedom of action were the key values involved in citizenship; however, the state would provide ‘the minimal conditions and standards necessary for the exercise of freedom’ (Plant and Vincent, 1984: 77). Education was the key element in developing citizenship, offering opportunities for personal development and becoming a right as well as a duty. This relationship between freedom and ability helped in fact to undermine the barrier between liberals and social democracy, in so far as some state intervention and social policy was deemed necessary by the former. The communitarians, for their part, and from a position rooted in the 1789 French Revolution Constitution, argued that it is difficult to imagine how empowering people in order to fulfil citizenship can be achieved without social solidarity and certain levels of wealth redistribution. However, in recent years these principles (social justice and social solidarity) have been put into question and part of the debate today is concerned with the extent to which the state should be responsible for the welfare of its citizens. This new thinking has taken place at the same time as economic restructuring has reshaped the labour markets and has put many people, who had previously experienced a relatively stable existence, into more vulnerable circumstances.

The relevance of this analysis to the debate on citizenship is that it clearly shows the impact of abandoning political commitments to welfare on the life chances of people. A sector of the population, currently conceptualized as the ‘underclass’, is increasingly differentiated from the rest of society and there is much evidence of the existence of increasing inequality of entitlements. In addition the attack on social rights in modern industrial societies is paralleled by a hardening of social conditions in underdeveloped economies (Roberts, 1991; Mingione, 1991; 1993). An important question is how this impact of nationally-based neo-liberalism on citizenship commitments relates to the increasing emphasis on the defence of human rights cross-nationally.

According to Soysal, human rights’ discourse has become an element of world culture which allows for ‘claims for rights from within or without national limits’ (1994: 7). Thus, on the basis of a common global understanding of human rights, national states are expanding responsibilities towards immigrants. This, however, does not inhibit the

17 For a critical analysis of the use of the concept in the European context see Gans, 1993; Morris, 1993; and Wacquant, 1993.
fact that closure is also being exercised on the basis of national sovereignty. She argues in favour of the human rights discourse as a positive element which has favoured the incorporation of guestworkers in Europe as members of these societies. This has taken place especially in the urban centres in which migrants concentrate and where they pay taxes, receive welfare, attend schools and organize their interests. Being part of cities like Berlin, for example 'precludes national fixities and allows for shifting categories and fluid confines' (1994: 166). The basis for participation and thus, practicing citizenship, is sharing a public space as well as common abstract principles, such as respect for justice. However, it is unclear for how long national governments will be committed to support or even consent to such participation when these long term residents are not represented in national parliaments or even on most local councils.18

Inclusion and exclusion in nation-states and cities

The relation between citizenship and national identity is often taken for granted, which means that citizenship is sacralized in relation to particular national values. For nationalists, for example, citizenship has a sacred value as it encompasses beliefs in common traditions and cultural values. At the other extreme there are the defenders of the desacralization of citizenship. Although politically the defenders of the first position are associated with the right and the second with the left (eg. in French politics), the division is not always that clear. Habermas has proposed that the exercise of civil rights be seen as the basis of a common democratic identity. This Habermas calls 'a reflexive appropriation of tradition' (1994: 23). However, it is also important to understand the historical processes which are still contributing to other understandings of citizenship.

In modern times, the nationalism of post revolution France has been less concerned with community identity — natio (people) — than with 'fostering people's identification with a role which demanded a high degree of personal commitment' — civitas (organised political association). According to this view, 'Nationalism is a form of collective consciousness which both presupposes a reflexive appropriation of cultural traditions that has been filtered through historiography and spreads only via the channels of modern mass communication'.19 Thus, 'the nation of citizens does not derive its identity from some common ethnic and cultural properties but rather from the praxis of citizens who actively exercise their civil rights'. Here ethnos is replaced by demos. However, this transition to constitutional democracy has been uneven even within Europe. Brubaker (1992) has demonstrated the sharp difference between the republican civic ideology of French definitions of nationhood and citizenship and the strong ethno-cultural component of German national self-understanding. He not only outlines the historical events which have shaped current national definitions, but also the implications for naturalization policies which affect immigrants' inclusion (thus the difference between the predominant jus soli in France and jus sanguinis in Germany). France appears as an exception within continental Europe where jus sanguinis predominates, whereas jus solis has been the logic of inclusion in the UK and the Americas.

The desacralization of citizenship would be possible if, among other things, there was an increasing obsolescence of the role of citizens as members of national armies. This may occur in a united Europe, but it is very unlikely in most other countries. However,

18 For an analysis of the current transformations in local democracy under the influence of the new right and the protection of social and political citizenship at the local level, taking the case study of Denmark, see Villadsen, 1993.
more important would be to disassociate citizenship from the politics of identity. On the one hand, the presence of millions of residents entitled to social and economic rights creates a de facto pluralism which contradicts traditional definitions of nationhood; on the other hand, the relation between the individual and the state in welfare societies is more instrumental and less emotional than in the past. These elements favour the construction of a ‘post-national formula’. ‘Post-national formations of membership challenge us to refurbish our definitions and theoretical vistas of and about citizenship and the national-state’ (Soysal, 1994: 167). There are those who support multicultural citizenship, advancing Switzerland as a successful example in Europe. The problem arises when assimilationist policies (such as the French policies) are imposed and rejected. In Germany and increasingly in France, there is a resistance to naturalization within the second and third generation members of the immigrant population. Outside western Europe the conflicts have become very difficult to handle. There are many examples in which the denial of ‘self-government’ rights has contributed to increasing bitterness among the members of one group in situations of unequal distribution of ethnic power. Shlomo Hasson explains how, among the many negative consequences in Jerusalem, this unequal power relation has created a negative social division of welfare for Palestinians, as well as stronger nationalist aspirations for secession. The problem remains ‘how to handle a complex urban problem of duality?’, as he notes.

Kymlicka (1995) has argued that the liberal idea of a shared conception of justice as the basis for citizenship (i.e. defended by Rawls, 1991) is inefficient if decisions concerning schooling, language and national as well as local decision-making do not accommodate ethnic identities. This has caused problems even in cities like Montreal, where constitutional democracy is well established. He defends instead the institutionalization of minority rights, which are in themselves problematic as they are based on a politics of ‘community’ and therefore ‘assume a commonality of political and economic interests and a homogeneity within the community’ (Anthias, 1992: 230-1). Empirical research carried out in London has shown the dangers of such a policy, as the hegemonic ‘community’ leadership does not always represent differences in gender and class within the ‘community’. Despite these considerations, minority rights appear at the top of the agenda of urban social problems to be solved in central and eastern Europe.

Cross-national contrast

The different case studies presented in this issue not only correspond to particular welfare regimes, but in particular show the considerable variations in the historical definition of citizenship. The most inclusive definitions in relation to immigration are found in countries of the Americas, whereas in Europe, policies are generally more inclusive in relation to citizens. However, ethnicity remains an important issue on both sides of the Atlantic. In the USA, for example, as the Fainsteins demonstrate, only a small sector of blacks have developed their careers through the political system, thus becoming members of the middle class; equal opportunities have been implemented within the public sector but not in the private sector, where discriminatory practices have continued; the incorporation of blacks onto local councils has not been extended to national administrations or politics; there has been a lack of participation of blacks in social contracts within the private sector; parallel to the contraction of job opportunities in the private sector for blacks, there has been a serious contraction in the supply of affordable housing in the 1980s; and, finally, there have been no political coalitions with other minorities, on the contrary strong hostility has developed between blacks and Latinos. Thus the legitimizing character of the practice of citizenship is highly questionable in US cities, partly because the welfare state is not comprehensive and creates very negative
images of those who become dependents, but also because prejudices and discrimination continue after full legal rights have been obtained by a particular minority. Thus, full participation with equal opportunities is not an automatic device provided by legal citizenship. Key questions include: Whether the social fabric which should be reinforced by the practice of citizenship has in fact been eroded as a consequence of increasing social and cultural differentiation? What are the reasons for such failure? Is Europe learning from the negative effects of following a liberal model of welfare?

Concerning social movements, the Fainsteins argue that ‘inclusion of Black leadership into legitimate political activity has contributed to the decline of Black social movements’ but also that ‘political, economic, and social divisions based on racial and ethnic differences impede the formulation of class-based demands for social rights’. Thus, there is a clear danger that social claims based on ethnic or community identities do not enhance but in fact tend to weaken the expansion of citizenship.

In Latin America, as in the USA, social movements have been important in defending old rights and demanding new ones. The expansion of social movements is clearly related to urbanization processes and so are the achievements of these movements. However, native Indians have not participated in nation building and therefore have been excluded from citizenship in various ways (from paternalistic protection to elimination), as Bryan Roberts explains in this issue. The most salient contrast, though, in the Latin American world is the lack of systematic constitutional democracy which could transform specific gains into constitutional rights. Without political participation rights become privileges, as is the case in Latin America for the relatively small proportion of workers who can participate in labour contracts. Roberts points out the important role played by undemocratic ruling elites who have repeatedly resorted to repression when they felt threatened by social pressure for economic and social rights. Thus a sort of opposition between economic/social rights and civic/political rights is part of the tradition through which citizenship has been experienced in those countries. In the 1980s, with the liberalization policies in the economy, this opposition has returned in a perverse way. Thus, the new campaigning for civil rights has the flavour of a commodity, exchanged against the loss of some social rights.

As suggested at the beginning of this introduction, a similar situation can be seen in the contrasting cases of central Europe. Here, the new values of ‘individualism’ and ‘pluralism’ are developed against an increasing loss of work, public medical care and pensions, as Zsuzsa Ferge argues in this issue. The return of civil society in many of these countries is far from comprehensive. According to Agh’s (1994) analysis of Hungary, the government and opposition parties seem to exhibit a common strategy of preventing workers’ unions and social movements from developing. Instead, a rediscovery of the values of the community on the basis of its ability, as well as that of the church and family, to offer support has resuscitated the Catholic principle of ‘subsidiarity’. With these values, there is little hope of citizenship being encouraged to develop from below and it is doubtful whether it can occur from above. By reinforcing local communities, instead of universal citizenship practices and values, without a parallel decentralization of political power and economic resources there is a danger of creating a differential social status with an ethnic element. In Hungary, the Romanies are disproportionately in poverty as Ferge explains in this issue, in Slovakia the Hungarians are the unwanted community. As Brubaker has pointed out, ‘citizenship is internally inclusive and externally exclusive’ (1994: 21). There is a long way to go to create mechanisms for the inclusion of the ethnic minorities scattered throughout the cities of central and eastern Europe and in many other cities of the world.

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